Purpose -This paper investigates the impact of regulations, reforms and legal environment on dividend policy in a different institutional setting. Particularly, it examines the firm-level cash dividend behaviour of publicly-listed firms in Turkey in the post-2003 period, since there were major economic and structural reforms as well as significant regulatory changes of dividend payout rules imposed by the supervisory bodies.
Introduction
Dividend policy has attracted a signifcant amount of attention in corporate finance literature. Miller and Modigliani (M&M) (1961) assert that, under the conditions of a perfect capital market, a managed dividend policy does not affect the firm value and therefore it is irrelevant. However, many scholars argue that real world capital markets are subject to various market imperfections (e.g. information asymmetries, differential taxes, transaction costs and agency problems) and suggest that dividends may be used as a very important mechanism to minimise such imperfections. Indeed, Lintner (1956) observes that US managers follow extremely deliberate (managed) dividend policies, contrary to M&M's prediction. In his pioneering study, Lintner detects that US managers tend to smooth dividends relative to earnings; they only increase their dividend payments when they believe that earnings can sustain higher dividend levels permanently, and are reluctant to cut dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist, since dividend cuts are bad signals to the market.
Nevertheless, dividend policy decisions are not always solely dependent on managers' judgement. This is because factors such as regulations and legal environments, institutional settings, financial crises, and trends in macro-economy may also have implications on a firm's dividend policy (Glen et al, 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b) . For example, Aivazian et al. (2003a) and Dewenter and Warther (1998) argue that dividend payments may be a more useful pre-commitment device to reduce agency problems and to signal insider information in the "Anglo-Saxon" capital markets. For instance, in the US and the UK, where the ownership structure is generally dispersed among small shareholders and the control remains concentrated in the hands of managers, corporations rely on arm's length contracting by "uninformed" and dispersed outside investors. In contrast, the "Continental-German-Japanese" banking model develops close ties between managers and investors, because bank debt is a contract with an informed investor (lender) who has access to confidential corporate information (due to direct communication, such as obtaining quarterly financial information in a standardised form or regular site visits) which is not available in the capital market. Consequently, they suggest that there are relatively lower levels of information asymmetry and agency conflicts in bank centric markets, and hence managed dividend policies might not be vital in these kinds of economies.
Furthermore, there is an evidence that in some countries with poor legal environment and weak minority shareholders' protection, typically emerging market (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Philippines, Venezuela and Turkey), governments and regulators have chosen to force publicly-listed firms to pay dividends in order to protect minority shareholders and creditors. Therefore, by dictating a minimum level of dividends (a mandatory dividend policy) that firms must adhere to, regulators have attempted to convince minority investors that they will not be expropriated (at least not entirely) and instead encourage them to invest in equity markets (Glen et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian, 2003a) . This highlights how important the institutional setting is to dividend policy and implies that different institutional and financial environments may have different effects on a firm's dividend payment decisions. Accordingly, our purpose is to investigate the implications of regulations, reforms and legal environment on dividend policy in a different institutional setting. We consider firm-level cash dividend behaviour of publicly-listed firms in Turkey over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . It is because Turkey provides an interesting set up to study the dividend policy behaviour of an emerging market (a civil law originated) which implemented major economic and structural reforms (common laws) starting with the fiscal year 2003. There were also significant changes in regulatory framework of cash dividend policy rules imposed by the supervisory bodies in the post-2003 period.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional background and dividend regulations in Turkey. Section 3 reviews the previous studies and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 illustrates the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
Institutional setting and dividend regulations in the Turkish market
Turkey had a very late start in the liberalisation of its economy and the establishment of its stock market, namely the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), whose history only dates back to 1986, compared to the developed stock exchanges with hundreds of years of historical development (Adaoglu, 2000; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) . Public corporations listed on the ISE were subject to the first mandatory dividend policy, which was put into effect by the Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey 1 , when it first started to operate in 1986.
According to the first regulation on dividend payments, the ISE-listed firms were obliged to distribute at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend -this was known as the first dividend and other types of payouts or maintaining profits as retained earnings were not legally possible without paying the first dividend. 1 The Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey is the sole regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the securities markets in Turkey. The CMB was established in 1982 as a statutory public legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy, empowered by the Capital Markets Law (CML) that was enacted in 1981, in order to maintain secure, transparent, efficient, fair and competitive capital markets, and to protect rights and interests of investors (CMB, 2003) . Adaoglu (1999; 2000) states that the reason behind the first mandatory dividend policy imposed by the CMB of Turkey was, probably, to protect minority shareholders' right by providing them satisfactory levels of dividends. This is because Turkey experienced a poor culture of corporate governance coupled with the lack of appropriate transparency and disclosure practices, with very poor minority shareholders' protection until the early 2000s (La Porta et al, 1997; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) . Besides, corporate ownership in Turkey is highly concentrated by families who generally owned business groups, which were affiliated with industrial and financial companies and subsidiaries that organised under the legal form of a holding company. The controlling families often attempted to use pyramidal corporate structures or even more complicated web of inter-corporate equity linkages and dual class shares to further enhance the control on their companies at the expense of other shareholders (Glen et al, 1995; Yurtoglu, 2003; Sevil et al, 2012) .
Furthermore, prior research (Aivazian et al, 2003a; 2003b; Ararat and Ugur, 2003; Erturk, 2003) indicates that Turkey had a bank-based financial system where private sector banks dominated the market and were mainly part of bigger family-owned holding companies. The popularity of holding company structures led the Turkish financial system to operate around large family-controlled business groups with a group-owned bank. Hence, families had control over many banks that belonged to their business groups, and also had control over their banks' lending decisions. This resulted in business groups obtaining much of their finance from their own banks -in other words allowing non-arm's length party transactions (Yurtoglu, 2003; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) .
As previously mentioned, Aivaizan et al. (2003a) and Dewenter and Warther (1998) argue that dividend payments may be a more useful pre-commitment device to reduce agency problems and to convey information in markets that are greatly dependent on arm's length transactions. Considering the nature of the ISE-listed firms' corporate structures, which were highly concentrated by large controlling families and characterised by bankcentred finance as well as close owner-bank-firm relations, one can easily deduce that cash dividends were not used to signal favourable insider information nor were they used as a disciplinary device, and managers did not much care about setting stable dividend policies in the early stages of the Turkish market. Applying Lintner's (1956) model, the studies of Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al (2003a) , which were conducted in early periods in Turkey (the periods 1985-1997 and 1983-1990 , respectively) demonstrated that ISE firms did not smooth their cash dividends and thus had unstable cash dividend polices; cash dividends were solely determined by current year earnings, as forced by the first dividend rule, and any volatility in earnings of the firms was directly reflected in the levels of current cash dividends.
However, Turkey had undergone major economic and structural reforms in the early 2000s. The CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve communications with investors, issuers and other institutions to ensure that markets were functioning in a safer, more transparent and more efficient manner in accordance with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international norms and developments (CMB, 2003) (2010, 2011 and 2012) , the CMB decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio and abolished mandatory minimum dividend payment distribution requirement for the ISE firms, which provided total freedom for the ISE-listed firms to make their own dividend policy decisions to pay or not to pay, with the requirement that any decisions made regarding dividends should be publicly disclosed.
Prior studies and research hypotheses
In a pioneering study, Lintner (1956) (1992) shows that Lintner model explains dividend behaviour in India. Pandey's (2001) research reveals that although Malaysian firms have low smoothing and less stable dividends (higher adjustment factors), they rely both on current earnings and past dividends.
In another study, Al-Najjar (2009) There are other types of blockholders (rather than family owners) that may take several distinct forms such as foreign shareholders, the state and financial institutions ownership. According to Grossman and Hart (1980) , Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , large shareholders have better incentives and ability to act as an effective monitoring mechanism on the management when the legal protection does not provide enough control rights to minority investors. The existence of such large shareholders can mitigate the free-rider problem of monitoring managers and the shareholders conflict, which minimises the agency problems and consequently reducing, in general, the need for paying cash dividends. Thus:
H2b: Firms with high prevalence of non-family blockholders are likely to have low target payouts and pay unsmoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.
The downside of ownership concentration is that the interests of large shareholders and minority owners might not be the same. If this is the case, large shareholders may attempt to generate private benefits of control that are not shared with outside shareholders and hence exacerbating agency cost problems by expropriating the wealth from minority owners (Johnson et al., 2000; Mork and Yeung, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) .
Aforementioned, dividends payments can play an important role in controlling the conflict of interest between large and minority shareholders, since dividends guaranty a pro-rata cash distribution to all shareholders and limit corporate funds from large shareholders' control.
Accordingly, we predict that although the existence of other non-family blockholders may reduce the importance of dividends as a disciplining mechanism and the need for dividend stability, family-controlled firms will still attempt to use dividends as a reputation device for fair treatment for minority owners when their firms are highly concentrated. Therefore:
H2c: Family-controlled firms with other non-family blockholders are likely to have high target payouts and pay moderately smoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.
Furthermore, in widely held firms, where ownership structure is dispersed among small shareholders, corporate managers are in the controlling positions. Since they are the insiders who control corporate assets, managers may misuse these resources at the expense of outside shareholders due the absence of effective monitoring, which is known as the principal-agent conflict. Nevertheless, dividend payments can be used to lessen these kinds of agency problems by reducing free cash flows and forcing firms to enter the external capital markets for additional funding, thus increase monitoring by the market (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) . Indeed, previous studies (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Moh'd et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; Farinha, 2003) generally show that minority shareholders desire higher dividend payments to increase dividend-induced capital market monitoring and reduce what is left for expropriation. Hence, we hypothesise:
H2d: Firms with dispersed ownership structures are likely to have higher target payouts and pay unsmoothed dividends in the post-2003 period in Turkey.
Corporate dividend policy literature suggests that there is a direct link between financial characteristics of a firm and its dividend policy decisions. In this respect, not surprisingly, we conjecture that the market integration process of Turkey, especially these major regulatory developments as explained, might lead the financial characteristics of ISE firms to significantly affect their dividend policies. While the Lintner model is expected to be valid in explaining dividend policy behaviour in Turkey, it does not indicate how financial characteristics affect dividend payments of the ISE firms. Therefore, we will investigate the effects of various fundamental financial factors on dividend policy decisions, in line with the prior research.
First, it is argued that profitability is one of the most important determinants of dividend policy and empirical studies generally report a positive relationship between firm's profitability and dividend payments (Fama and French, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ferris et al., 2006) . Contrarily, a firm's funds requirements for growth (investment) opportunities appear to have a negative impact on dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Aivazian et al., 2006) . Similarly, a firm's debt policy is associated with dividend payments in a negative way, since dividends and debt are considered as alternative mechanisms to control agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Al-Najjar, 2009 ). Given that the CMB of Turkey has shown a serious effort to prevent credit risk concentration and insider lending within the same business group companies, the ISE firms find external financing a way more costly, rather than obtaining much of their funds required from their own business group banks, in the post-2003 period. Hence, we propose that ISE firms are more likely to use their internally generated earnings to fund their investments, instead of distributing them as a cash dividend. By emphasising the transaction costs involved with external financing and the substitution role of debt for dividends in controlling agency problems, we also predict that ISE firms with more debt are less likely to pay dividends.
Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H3b: There is a negative association between investment opportunities and dividend policy in the post-2003 period in Turkey.

H3c: There is a negative association between debt policy and dividend policy in the post-2003 period in Turkey.
Moreover, firm age and firm size are other two important factors that appear to be positively influencing dividend policy in the literature. Since firms get older in terms of age, in other words mature firms, they tend to have steady earnings and hence are able to preserve a good level of funds. This allows them to pay higher dividends (Grullon et al., 2002) .
Likewise, it is documented that large firms are generally mature organisations and have easier access to capital markets at lower costs but they usually face higher potential agency problems as they expand, compared to smaller firms. Accordingly, this results in a positive relationship between firm size and dividends (Moh'd et al., 1995; Fama and French, 2001; Ferris et al., 2006) . Based on the above discussion and given the new regulatory reforms in preventing insider lending, we dispute that more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more likely to sustain stable funds and have easier access to capital markets (to raise costly external finance if needed), and so they are less dependent on retained earnings and hence they can manage to pay higher dividends. Therefore: 
Data and Methodology
Data
We obtain the data for this study from several different sources. Information on accounting and financial variables is derived from DATASTREAM, whereas the data on firms' ownership and incorporation dates are compiled from the annual reports published in the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) of the ISE and firms' official websites. The validity of the data is also cross checked with OSIRIS database. We, then, construct our sample as follows. First, we consider all publicly listed firms on the ISE over the period 2003-2012.
Second, we narrow the sample down to firms whose data are available on DATASTREAM.
Third, we exclude financial (Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code 8000) and utility 
Research design, models and variable construction
In order to test our hypotheses related to the target payout ratio and dividend smoothing (i.e., H1, H2a, H2b, H2c, and H2d), we first employ a modified specification of Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment model. In particular, (i) following Fama and Babiak (1968) -as many other researchers, such as Adaoglu (2000), Aivazian et al. (2003a) , Al-Najjar (iv) Finally, we also consider the issue of endogeneity and use one-year lagged values for all independent variables in the model, ensuring that the five financial characteristics are predetermined with respect to the dividend payment decision, to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Accordingly, we estimate a logit model by the following equation:
where DPAY i,t is the probability of paying dividends (dependent variable), which is a binary code (0/1) that equals to 1 if the firm pays a dividend and 0 otherwise in a given year over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] ; ROA is the return on assets ratio (profitability) measured as net earnings to total assets; INVEST is the market-to-book ratio (investment opportunities);
DEBT is the debt ratio measured as total debt divided by total assets; AGE is the firm age calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of years since the firm's incorporation date; SIZE is the firms size measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation;
PERIOD is a dummy taking a value of 0 for the sub-period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] 2003-2008 and 1% during 2009-2012 , which is the only statistically significant difference between two sub-periods. Moreover, the board size and controlling family members on the board in the last two rows of the Panel B illustrate that at least one family member takes a place on the board, which are generally sized on 6-7 executives, similarly in both time periods.
Panel C in Table 1 firms, on average, significantly increased their cash dividend payments from 16 million TL to 26 million TL; however, their average dividend yield ratio significantly dropped from 2.1% to 1.6% during this sub-period.
Analysis of a modified specification of Lintner model
We apply our modified specification of Lintner's (1956) Table 2 shows the results of estimates from the pooled OLS regressions.
(Insert Table 2 here)
The results indicate that the overall pooled OLS models estimating the modified Moreover, we add a dummy variable (PERIOD) that takes a value of 0 for the second mandatory dividend policy time interval (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and 1 for the period when there was no compulsory dividend payout requirement (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Because, we attempt to identify whether there is an impact of considerably different policy regulations on dividends over our entire research period. We also create two interaction term variables to provide further insights on the interaction effects of sub-periods and earnings per share (PERIOD x EPS), and that of sub-periods and lagged dividends per share (PERIOD x DPS t-1 ) on current dividends per share. As Panel A in Table 2 illustrates, PERIOD coefficients are negative and significant (t = −1.77, p < 0.10 for all firms and t = −1.69, p < 0.10 for dividend-payers). The estimated coefficients on PERIOD x EPS are negative and significant (t = −1.90, p < 0.10 for all firms and t = −1.86, p < 0.10 for dividend-payers), whereas PERIOD x DPS t-1 show a positive and highly significant interaction effect (t = 6.08, p < 0.01 for all firms and t = 5.52, p < 0.01 for dividend-payers).
At first glance, the negative impact of sub-periods dummy suggests that there is a tendency to decrease dividends in the second sub-period 2009-2012, when firms are not subject to imposed policy regulations, compared to the first sub-period 2003-208. In addition to the positive relationship between past and current year's dividends per share, the interaction of sub-period dummy and lagged dividends per share also has a positive effect on current dividends per share. This implies that ISE firms tend to make stabilized dividends although mandatory dividend regulations are abolished. However, current year's earnings per share through the interaction with period dummy has an inverse impact on current dividends. This may indicate either that ISE firms are more likely to avoid immediate response to earnings increases or losses; instead they attempt to balance stable dividends and prevent spectacular changes in the short-run, or that ISE firms are less willing to pay cash dividends in the second sub-period. Therefore, we need to rearrange our research model of the modified Lintner specification (Equation (1)) to understand how to interpret these coefficients and to identify their effects on dividend policy and stability.
So we recall Equation (1):
(PERIOD i,t x EPS i,t ) + β 5 (PERIOD i,t x DPS i,t -1 ) +
Let PERIOD = 0, which reflects the sub-period 2003-2008: 
DPS i,t = (α i + β 3 ) + (β 1 + β 4 )EPS i,t + (β 2 + β 5 )DPS i,t-1 + ∑ =1 β j INDUSTRY j,i,t + u i,t (1d)
Accordingly, the calculation of Lintner's parameters changes when PERIOD = 1, as we must consider the interaction terms coefficients to capture the effects of earnings per As suggested by Lintner (1956) , the SOA parameter shows how reactive dividends are to earnings changes, and lies between 0 and 1 (0 < c ≤ 1). A high SOA indicates a speedy adjustment towards the target; for instance, the SOA of 1 (at its maximum level)
implies that the firm does not adjust or smooth cash dividends, instead it relies on the longrun TPR. A reverse argument is valid for low SOAs that indicate slower adjustments; for example, a value of SOA closed to zero means that the firm smooths dividend payments and slowly adjusts to the TPR. In this respect, Panel A in Table 2 (Insert Table 3 here) Table 3 We further perform additional tests to check how robust our main results are.
Although it is suggested that the partial adjustment model can be consistently estimated by the OLS 3 (Gujarati, 2003) , Blundell and Bond (1998) Fama and Babiak (1968) ) in Model 2, and by including the current and lagged debt ratio (following Mookerjee (1992) ) in Model 3. Table   4 shows the estimates of the pooled OLS in Panel A and the system GMM estimates in (Insert Table 4 here)
Analysis of ownership structure effect on Lintner model specification
In order to ascertain how ownership structure affects the target payout ratio and dividend smoothing of ISE-listed firms, we apply our modified Lintner specification (Model 1) on several subsamples that are constructed according to the type and existence of large shareholders. Therefore, we stratify our sample into four categories; Subsample A is comprised of firms under family control with large family ownership concentration.
Subsample B consists of firms that are characterised by high prevalence of non-family blockholders (e.g., foreign and domestic institutional investors and the state) only. Firms in Subsample C are dominated by large controlling families and other non-family blockholders.
Subsample D contains widely-held firms that have dispersed ownership structure with single ownership below %5. Accordingly, Table 5 shows the results of pooled OLS estimates for our four stratified subsamples based on observations both from all firms and dividend-paying firms.
(Insert Table 5 here)
The results reveal that F-statistics of each of the eight pooled OLS regressions (four subsamples based on two estimates) are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating overall significance of all models. The R-squared values of estimated equations vary between 44% to 63% and thus suggest an acceptable level of goodness of fit. Furthermore, we observe that our main variables, current EPS and lagged DPS, and the dummy variable for sub-periods (PERIOD) with the interaction terms (PERIOD x EPS and PERIOD x DPS t-1 )
are statistically significant, although at different conventional significance levels, and have the same directional impacts as explained in the previous sub-section, in all regressions.
However, the coefficients of these variables comparatively differ among four subsamples and hence indicate that the target payout ratios and dividend smoothing behaviour of firms in four categories are significantly different from each other. As hypothesised, this reflects the impact of ownership structure on dividend stability explanation proposed by Lintner (1956) .
In this respect, our first important finding is that Subsample A has the highest target payout ratios (the TPRs of 29.7% and 27.4% for all firms, and 32.3% and 29.6% for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively) and, more interestingly, the lowest adjustment factors (the SOAs of 0.249 and 0.218 for all firms, and 0.251 and 0.223 for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). Al-Najjar and
Kilincarslan (2016) suggest that although family ownership is negatively associated with dividend payout, families do not seem to expropriate through cash dividends in Turkey since all other types of shareholders (even minority investors) also have significantly negative effects on the amount of dividend payouts. Our finding, however, reveals that the ISE firms with family ownership concentration and control aim high cash dividend distribution and display the stickiest dividend behaviour (in other words, the most stable dividend policies).
This is also inconsistent with the expropriation argument and instead shows that when Moreover, Subsample C has the second highest target payout ratios (the TPRs of 25% and 22.9% for all firms, and 27.7% and 23.5% for dividend-payers in the first and second sub-period, respectively) and it has relatively moderate levels of speed of adjustments (the SOAs of 0.464 and 0.402 for all firms, and 0.470 and 0.404 for dividendpayers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). This finding shows that the ISE firms that are dominated my families and other types of large shareholders also aim to pay high cash dividends but, differently from the firms under family control only, the existence of nonfamily blockholders decreases the degree of dividend smoothing. As predicted, families still attempt to use dividends as a reputation device for fair treatment of minority investors when their firms are highly concentrated with the presence of non-family blockholders, although less stable compared to firms in Subsample A. Finally, the ISE firms with dispersed ownership structures in Subsample D follow stable dividend policies by a serious degree of smoothing (the SOAs of 0.362 and 0.311 for all firms, and 0.360 and 0.302 for dividendpayers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). However, they have the lowest payout ratios (the TPRs of 9.9% and 9% for all firms, and 11.1% and 10.3% for dividendpayers in the first and second sub-period, respectively). This evidence is contrary to our prediction that minority shareholders have a taste for higher dividends to increase dividendinduced capital market monitoring and reduce what is left for expropriation, as well as inconsistent with a number of studies, such as Rozeff (1982) , Moh'd et al. (1995) , La Porta et al. (2000) and Farinha (2003) . Instead, this may imply that small shareholders in Turkey have a preference for capital gains over cash dividends. Consequently, above discussion provides support for H2a, H2b and H2c, but leads us to reject H2d.
Again, we conduct further tests by employing the system GMM regressions for each of the eight model specifications of our subsamples, in order to check whether our findings are robust or sensitive to the usage of a different econometric technique. As illustrated in Table 6 , our system GMM estimates are consistent with our pooled OLS estimates and provide very similar TPRs and SOAs that reported in Table 5 .
(Insert Table 6 here)
Analysis of financial characteristics effect on dividend payment decisions
In this sub-section, we compute our logit model (Equation (2)) to identify how financial characteristics of ISE firms influence their dividend payment decisions, by applying pooled logit and random effects (panel) logit regression estimates. We also calculate the marginal effects (economic significance) of the independent variables to provide further interpretations in addition to the coefficient estimates (statistical significance). Table 7 reports the results of the pooled and random effects logit estimations on the probability of firms to pay dividends in the Turkish market.
(Insert Table 7 here)
The results show that when our logit model is estimated by the pooled logit regression, it is overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as evidenced by the Wald X 2 test. The Pseudo R 2 value of 35.48% suggests a good indication as to the prediction power of the model. Similarly, the random effects (panel) regression also estimates that the model is overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as reported by the Wald X 2 test. In this case, the likelihood-ratio test is highly significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the proportion of the total variance, contributed by the panel-level variance component (rho value) is significantly different from zero (0.6123). This suggests that random effects logit regression is more suitable than pooled logit regression in estimating the relationship between financial variables and dividend payment decisions in the ISE. This is also consistent with Gujarati (2003) which states that a random effect logit model, which uses both within and between (group) possible variations, is more favourable than a pooled logit model (ignoring the firm effects) in its estimating power, since it allows the derivation of more efficient estimators. Hence, we report our findings based on the random effects logit estimates, although both types of regressions provide similar results.
The random effects logit estimates in Table 7 reveal that there is a strong positive correlation between profitability (ROA) and the probability of an ISE firm to distribute a cash dividend. The coefficient on ROA (z = 5.99, p < 0.01) is positive and highly significant, and the marginal effect of this variable shows, other things being equal, that a 10 percentage point increase in ROA will increase the probability of paying dividends by approximately 11.37%. This suggests that more profitable ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends to signal their better financial performance, in line with previous research (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ferris et al., 2006) . However, there is evidence that investment opportunities have a negative effect on dividend payment decisions of the ISE firms, since the coefficient on INVEST is negative and statistically significant (z = −3.02, p < 0.01). The marginal effect of INVEST indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in investment opportunities will decrease the likelihood of paying a cash dividend by about 1.5% for an average firm. This means that ISE firms with more investment opportunities need more funds, therefore they are more likely to preserve earnings for investments rather than paying dividends, consistent with studies such as Rozeff (1982) , Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Aivazian et al. (2006) .
The results reveal another negative association, which is between firm debt level and dividend payment decisions. The coefficient on DEBT is negative and statistically significant (z = −2.63. p < 0.01) and the marginal effect of this variable shows that the probability of paying a cash dividend drops by around 2.78%, corresponding to a 10 percentage increase in debt level. This finding is in line with the notion that debt and dividends are alternative mechanisms in controlling agency problems and supports the argument that higher debt levels lead to higher risk and transaction cost involved with external financing (Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Al-Najjar, 2009 ). Thus, ISE firms attempt to maintain their earnings to lower costly external financing, which results in distributing non or lower dividends. Moreover, the results report that corporate dividend payment decisions of ISE firms are positively affected by firm age (AGE) and size (SIZE). The coefficients on AGE (z = 2.24, p < 0.05) and SIZE (z = 7.31, p < 0.01) are both positive and statistically significant.
The marginal effects of AGE and SIZE confirm these positive associations and indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in AGE and SIZE will approximately result in a 0.65% and 1.02% increase in the probability of paying a cash dividend, respectively. This evidence implies that more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends, consistent with Grullon et al. (2002) , Moh'd et al. (1995) , Fama and French (2001) and Ferris et al. (2006) . This is possibly because they can sustain stable funds and have easier access to capital markets, thereby less dependent on retained earnings, which enable them to pay higher dividends.
We further detect that the random effects estimates show no significant impact of the Moreover, our findings reveal that listed firms in the ISE have highly concentrated ownership structures, where the control is generally in the hands of families with the existence of other large shareholders, such as foreign and domestic financial investors and the state. In this setting, we find that ownership structure affects the target payout ratio and dividend smoothing in Turkey, probably because the concerns about cash dividends differ among the type and the existence of large shareholders. Indeed, it is observed that the ISE firms with family ownership concentration and control aim the highest target payout ratios and also display the stickiest cash dividend. This suggests that signalling is an important concern for Turkish families and they attempt to show their solid financial performance by stable cash dividend payments. Based on the "substitution model of dividends" proposed by
La porta et al. (2000), this may also imply that Turkish families use cash dividends to establish a reputation of good treatment for minority shareholders of the firms under their control.
Furthermore, we find that the ISE firms with non-family blockholders (e.g., foreign
and domestic financial investors and the state) significantly decrease the target payout ratios and abolish dividend smoothing. Similarly, the presence of non-family large shareholders reduces the degree of dividend smoothing of the ISE firms that are dominated by families and also have other types of blockholders. This evidence may imply that, consistent with the notion, argued by Grossman and Hart (1980) , Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , large shareholders have better incentives and ability to act as an effective monitoring mechanism on the managements, which minimises the agency problems and consequently reducing, in general, the need for paying cash dividends. In addition, our findings show that although the ISE firms with dispersed ownership structures attempt to adjust their cash dividends by a serious degree of smoothing, they seem to have comparatively very low target payouts. This is contrary to the common belief that minority investors prefer higher dividends to increase dividend-induced capital market monitoring and reduce what is left for expropriation.
Finally, we also detect that financial characteristics of firms have significant effects on their dividend policy -in particular, more profitable, more mature and larger sized ISE firms are more likely to pay cash dividends, whereas the ISE firms with higher investment opportunities and more debt are less likely to involve with cash dividend distributions. These financial characteristics have the same influence on dividend decisions over the entire period, although this period has witnessed significantly different dividend policy regulations imposed by the CMB in the two sub-periods of 2003-2008 and 2009-2012. Overall, our results present strong evidence that regulations, reforms and legal environment have significant implications on the ISE-listed firms' dividend policy behaviour in the post-2003 period. Particularly, the ISE firms now follow stable dividends policies, although relatively less stable policies than developed markets, and the financial characteristics of these firms influence their dividend policy in a similar manner of a more developed countries. Hence, our study provides useful information for potential investors, policy makers and fellow researchers, about these changes in the Turkish market. The study also raises the need to assess how the market reacts to the changing dividend policy behaviour of the ISE firms. However, this is a promising question left for future research. .913*** Notes: Total sales represent annual gross sales and other operating revenue. Total assets refer to the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. Market capitalisation equals the share price (year-end) multiplied by the common shares outstanding. Net earnings represent annual income after all operating and non-operating income and expenses, reserves, income taxes, minority interest and extraordinary items. Total debt is the sum of long and short term debt. Return on assets is measured by net earnings to total assets. Market-to-book ratio is calculated as a firm's market value divided by its book value. Debt ratio is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Firm age is the natural logarithm of firm's age in years. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the firm. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% a nd 10% levels, respectively. Family ownership represents the total percentage of outstanding shares held by family members, family managers and family-controlled holding companies. Foreign ownership is the sum of total shares owned by foreign corporations, foreign financial institutions and foreign nationals. Domestic institutional holdings refer to the total percentage of shares held by Turkish financial institutions. State ownership includes the central government and its wholly owned enterprises' shareholdings. Miscellaneous represents the share-ownership of organisations such as cooperatives, voting trusts and a company or a group with no single controlling investor. Ownership dispersion is measured as the total percentage of shares owned by a large number of small (minority) shareholders who held less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the firm. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Cash dividend-payers refer to the percentage number that is measured as cash dividend paying firms divided by total firms in the sample. Cash dividends equal to the total annual common and preferred dividends paid in cash to shareholders. Dividends per share represent the total dividends per share declared annually. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as the dividends per share divided by the earnings per share. Dividend yield is measured as the ratio of dividends per share to price per share.
† Dividend payout ratio has 1,144 firm-year observations for the 2003-2008 period and 922 firmyear observations for the 2009-2012 period, due to the exclusion of negative payout ratio observations when firms make losses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The pooled OLS models are tested using White's corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. The two-step, robust (Windmeijer's standard error correction), small (corrections that results in t instead of z statistic for the coefficients and F instead of Wald X 2 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) commands are used to make the system GMM estimates even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The study investigates dividend polices of firms from eight different emerging markets and a control sample of US firms; however, we only report the results provided from the Turkish market. This table reports coefficients and t-statistics in the parenthesis. The two-step, robust (Windmeijer's standard error correction), small (corrections that results in t instead of z statistic for the coefficients and F instead of Wald X 2 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) commands are used to make the system GMM estimates even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
